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Abstract
The 1919 Government of India Act instituted sweeping constitutional reforms that were
inspired by the concept of “dyarchy”. This innovation in constitutional history devolved
powers to the provinces and then divided these roles of government into reserved and
transferred subjects, the latter of which would be administered by elected Indian ministers.
Recent scholarship has been reassessing the local biopolitical potential unleashed by the
1919 Act. In this paper I revisit dyarchy at the national scale to show how this “All-India” re-
visioning of Indian sovereignty was actually negotiated in relation to its imperial and
international outsides and the exigencies of retaining governmental control inside the
provinces. This paper will propose a constitutional historical geography of dyarchy, focusing
on three scales and the forms of comparison they allow. First, Lionel Curtis’s political
geometries and the international genealogies of his federalist aspirations are explored.
Secondly, the partially democratic level of the province is shown to have been rigorously
penetrated by, and categorically subordinated to, the central tier of colonial autocracy,
which orchestrated a political geography of exclusion and exception. Finally, rival
conceptions of time and sequentiality will be used to examine the basis for nationalist
criticisms and exploitations of dyarchy’s reconfigurations of democracy, biopolitics, and the
vital mass of the people.
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“The myriad problems of India must be and can be solved only by the Indians in
India. Strangers to Indian life and sentiment, animated with the nobler motives
which have governed the best of Englishmen in India, may be efficient rulers, may
even be good rulers—so long as the functions of the State are no more than those of
a policeman. Change the ideal of the State, and no one people could govern another,
especially those so utterly dissimilar in their habits and sentiments as the Indians
and the English. Indians, when they come to rule in India, may quite conceivably be
no better policeman than the English—perhaps no better engineers, financiers,
diplomats, lawyers, or soldiers. But they are bound to be, —in spite of themselves, in
spite of their history, —immeasurably superior in all those subtle, indescribable
attributes, which go to make good government as against efficient government,
which help to uplift an entire people.”2
A changed ideal of the State?
The early decades of the twentieth century saw a pitched battle in India over the ideal of the state.
What were its objectives and priorities? How should its achievements be judged? And how did it
relate to rationalities of government? An imperial ideal, manifested in the colonial Government of
India, was of a disciplinary, rational and efficient governmental science, protected and produced by
autocratic state machinery. An emerging nationalist ideal, manifested in political parties, liberal
theory, and popular sentiment, was of a “good government”, attuned to Indian life, habit and
sentiment, and practiced in the subtle and indescribable attributes of the democratic art.3 This was
the view of K.A. Shah, Professor of Economics at the University of Bombay, and Miss GJ Bahadurji,
Principal of Alexandra Girls’ English Institute.4 It was expressed not in a political speech nor in a
rousing nationalist pamphlet, but in a 400 page scholarly commentary on the 1919 Government of
India Act.5 This act had instituted what was popularly referred to as “dyarchy”, the devolution and
division of the functions of government into central and provincial tiers, the second of which was
sub-divided into reserved and transferred subjects (see table 1).6 The former were administered by
the, often British, officials of the Indian Civil Service, the latter by elected Indian officials. If these
officials proved themselves proficient in government further subjects could be transferred from the
reserved pool, until the bicameral system became one chamber of wholly transferred subjects, at
which point dyarchy would consume itself. Direct elections were established with an increased
franchise variably determined by: residency; the payment of land revenue; rent or rates or of income
tax; or by service in the forces.7 But democracy was more than an extended (though still tiny)
franchise.8 It was about “subtle, indescribable attributes”, good government, a commitment to the
people and a sense of shared responsibility. While the designers of India’s constitutional reform had
3initially interpreted responsible government as responsibility for transferred subjects, it quickly
became interpreted as responsibility to the people.9
Yet dyarchy is, to some, the stuff of dusty constitutional history. Its spaces are those of the financial
accounts ledger of regional bureaucrats, or of the arcane tables and charts by which fisheries, forests
and farms (transferred) were partitioned from banks, justice and the police (reserved):
CENTRAL PROVINCIAL
Military, foreign affairs, tariffs & customs,
railway, post & telegraphs, income tax, currency,
coinage & public debt, commerce & shipping,
civil & criminal law, audit of provincial
expenditure.
Local Self Government, medical admin & public
health, education, public works and irrigation,
land revenue admin, famine relief, agriculture,
forests, excise, admin of justice, industrial
matters, police and jails, minor ports
RESERVED TRANSFERRED
Water supplies, land revenue administration,
famine relief, land acquisition, justice, law
reports, stamps, mineral resources, ports,
waterways, police, newspaper control, European
vagrancy, coroners, prisons, audit, money
borrowing
LSG, medical administration, public health,
sanitation, vital statistics, pilgrimages, education,
public works, agriculture, veterinary services,
fisheries, cooperative societies, forests, excise,
registration, industry, stores, weights, libraries,
elections
Table1: devolution and division under dyarchy.10
In this paper I would like to join the small but growing ranks of those arguing that it is time to
reappraise dyarchy. This is not to argue for or against the efficiency with which it fulfilled its destiny
of self-destruction, or facilitated the training of Indian bureaucrats in self-government. Rather, I
would like to suggest that if we approach dyarchy with an eye to its scales of operation we can see it
in a new light. Just as commentators saw at the time, dyarchy triangulated autocracy, bureaucracy
and democracy in new and exciting ways. It presented the possibility of a government that was
attuned to the affective demands of its peoples, and it presented opportunities for nationalist
politics because (not in spite) of the imperial scalar sovereignty that it embodied.11 After introducing
some of the debates about dyarchy and how to write a constitutional history, this paper will propose
a constitutional historical geography of dyarchy, focusing on three scales and the forms of
comparison they allow. This will draw upon geographical debates about scale which suggest that we
4refuse to think of scales as natural, focusing on them rather as effects of specific networks and of the
nominalist power of naming.12
First, this paper will explore the vertical ontologies that structured dyarchy, through reading Lionel
Curtis’s political geometries and the international genealogies of his federalist aspirations. Secondly,
the democratic level of the province, at which Indian ministers would debate and administer certain
functions of government, will be shown to have been rigorously penetrated by, and categorically
subordinated to, the central tier of colonial autocracy, which matched geographies of
“backwardness” with exceptional “degrees of exclusion”. Finally, rival conceptions of time-scale and
sequentiality will be used to suggest that the imperial approach to constitutional reform was ‘out of
time’.13 This was due to the autocratic inability to comprehend the nationalist reconfiguration of
democracy, biopolitics, and the vital mass of the people.14 In a 1928 text with which this paper will
conclude, Shah and Bahadurji’s earlier insistence on the affective and vitalist irrelevance of the
colonial state was re-articulated, because political government: “…involves an appreciation of
collective thoughts, social forces, political energies, and not of these alone, but also of vague moods
and unvocal feelings which are always facts for politics and may, at any time, become facts in
politics.”15
Approaching Dyarchy and Constitutional History
My use of a scalar analysis does not so much bring a new perspective to bear on dyarchy as both
critically engages its inherent logic and disentangles it from a historiographical spat. The latter
focuses on the “Cambridge School” and its analysis of the 1919 reforms in the explicitly scalar terms
of Locality, Province and Nation.16 A common, though not uniform, assertion in this literature was
that nationalist politics depended not on regional uniformities of kith and kin but on the struggle for
influence and political patronage that the scalar structure of dyarchy allowed: “In other words they
were vertical alliances, not horizontal alliances.”17 One of the key figures in the group, Anil Seal,
made two persuasive arguments about dyarchy: that Indian politics was an interconnected system
working at several levels; and that the Government of India had much to do with linking those
levels.18 This, however, provided the platform for a series of suggestions which contributed to these
writings being branded as a new imperial school of historiography. Regarding the “ramshackle
coalitions” of nationalism, for instance, Seal suggested that: “Its unity seems a figment. Its power
appears as hollow as that of the imperial authority it was supposedly challenging. Its history was the
rivalry of Indian and Indian, its relationship with imperialism that of the mutual clinging of two
unsteady men of straw.”19
5This view was branded by the subaltern studies collective, in the early 1980s, as a re-articulation of
colonial historiography, which could only view nationalism as responding to colonial structures and
stimuli. In an early, wide ranging review of the Cambridge school, Gyanendra Pandey had suggested
that Seal’s use of scalar levels was practically meaningless as it failed to recognise the co-
constitution of, for instance, the provincial level by that of the districts, the tehsils, Delhi or
London.20 The Cambridge scalar framework, in a point Pandey attributed to Ranajit Guha, excluded
recognition of those groups beyond the Raj’s all-India constitutional reforms.21 Pandey insisted that
the peasant did have an intellectual life, and asked whose history we should seek to write;
effectively a clarion call for the subaltern studies collective he helped to establish. For its chief,
Ranajit Guha, subaltern politics was an autonomous domain with its own forms of collective political
action, beyond state structures or elite nationalists: “Mobilisation in the domain of elite politics was
achieved vertically whereas in that of subaltern politics this was achieved horizontally”.22
The brilliant success of the subaltern studies school in shifting our attention to the non-elite, to
politics beyond the state, and, later, to nationalism as discourse and practice, removed
constitutional reform from many scholarly agendas.23 While recent years have witnessed a turn to
engaging with governmentality, sovereignty, state economy and urban politics, dyarchy remains
under considered.24 This may be because of a residual connection to the damned Cambridge school,
or possibly an effect of the belief that the study of the “national” as a scale must reinforce either the
colonial apparatus of the Raj, the subaltern-suppressing geographical imagination of an elite
nationalism, or the empirical over-generalisations of imperial geography, history or anthropology.25
This is not to say that dyarchy has been totally ignored. Earlier accounts situated it within longer
administrative and governmental histories, its effects on taxation and financial responsibility, and
the political economy of its time.26 More recent approaches have tended to focus on transferred
subjects and the way in which this created provincial possibilities for experimentation.27 But these
do not tackle dyarchy as constitutional reform.28
To do this, we have to ask what constitutional history is, and how we might write it? By its
chronologies? Or the places in which it was enforced or escaped? Do we imagine its international
intellectual histories or its national and endogenous lives? Do we focus on the ways by which
dyarchy increased the capacity of the government to tax, as part of a drive for financial
responsibility? Do we accept its own disciplinary lens (of the juridical and the legislative) or can we
examine it as lived and actualised governmental rationalities, or as a mentality within its own textual
historiography? A governmentality methodology will frame the paper that follows, trying to think
about the scalar effects of dyarchy in practice, after engaging with some of the huge literature that
6emerged around dyarchy at the time. If dyarchy has been forgotten from the 1980s onwards, it
seemed to be upon everybody’s minds in the 1920s. Then, as now, the question was: how does one
investigate a constitution?
The 1919 Government of India Act had, in implementing dyarchy, provisioned for a commission into
its effects ten years henceforth. Nationalist demands for reform had led to this enquiry starting a
year earlier than planned, in the form of the catastrophically white Simon ‘Indian Statutory
Commission’. The seventeen volume report that followed exhaustively dissected dyarchy. In so
doing it also faced the challenge of how to investigate a constitution. The Government of India’s
memorandum to the commission suggested that: “An account of the working of the system may be
either a chapter of political history, an administrative record or a conspectus of constitutional life
and progress.”29 The first two were said to exist and that the actual working of the constitution
would not be outlined. The constitutional conspectus that was provided, however, consisted of four
ascending assessments, of: the relations of the representative legislature to the executive; the
influence of the legislature on the executive; the superintendence of the Government of India over
provincial governments; and the obedience of the Government of India to the Secretary of State for
India, via the United Kingdom Parliament. The form of investigating a constitution, for the
government, directly mimicked the scalar structure of dyarchy itself; from the provinces, to the
national capital, to the imperial capital.
Some Indian commentators agreed that it was impossible to tell the entire institutional history of a
political system, but suggested that Acts of Parliament were only the “bare skeletons” into which the
“breath of life” came from other sources.30 Going beyond the government’s constitutional
conspectus, another thorough review of dyarchy in “theory and practice” insisted that it be reviewed
in terms of the vitality of the people, insisting that constitutional history be written in terms of
biopolitics as much as of sovereignty:
“We have naturally to look to other things as well for forming a just estimate, and
these are the economic condition of the people, their resources, their fighting
strength against famines and the ravages caused by epidemics, as also their position
in the sphere of education, the educational facilities open to them, and above all the
share they enjoy in moulding and directing the policy of their Government.”31
These perspectives and their approaches to temporal scale will be returned to in the concluding
section, having explored the colonial governmental, not just constitutional, rationalities at play
within dyarchy. But it is clear that the perspectives above represent internal, national views on what
was often viewed as an imperial, international question.32 In Arthur Berriedale Keith’s otherwise
national-scale constitutional history of India, for instance, the final chapter was given over to the
7ramifications of “Dominion status” that India had been promised in 1919, as part of the dyarchy
debates, and then denied.33 At that stage “Dominion status” had meant little in India, but it had
much greater significance for imperial federalists, to whose international networking dyarchy owed
its origins.
International connections and vertical scale
Inspired, in part, by Britain’s experiences in the Boer Wars (1880-81 and 1899-1902), calls for a
radical overhaul of the Empire came to be passionately articulated by the “Round Table”
campaigners. Many of these men had been educated at Oxford, worked with Lord Milner in South
Africa, and were convinced of the need for British imperial world influence, which was felt to be a
force for good and for peace.34 The only solution they could envisage was an imperial federation: “…
a Commonwealth of Nations each independent but committed to a transcendent form of British
liberal, democratic government in which a constitutional monarchy would be retained.”35 Defence,
foreign and colonial policies would be transferred from Westminster to a peripatetic imperial
parliament, while internal government would be more fully devolved (a division that would
resurface in dyarchy). For one of the key members of the Round Table, Lionel Curtis, this movement
was the logical outcome of the move towards self-government in the Dominions (the white settler
colonies of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand).36
India, however, presented a headache for the Round Table: “It occupied a half-way house between
the settlement colonies, which enjoyed responsible government, and the dependencies, governed
by British fiat, and deemed by London unlikely to progress towards autonomy in the near or distant
future.”37 Yet its estimated contribution of 1200000 men to the 1914-18 war effort led to
uncontainable Indian demands for political reward and steps towards self-government; as such the
1919 Government of India Act must be recognised as itself a relict and product of the World War.38
In an attempt to address this imperial constitutional dilemma, Curtis visited India in 1916 and ended
up staying for a year and a half, promoting his emerging plans for dyarchy to Sir Edwin Montagu, the
Secretary of State for India who had made an independent announcement on Indian dialogue in
1917 following united nationalist demands for increased self-government after the war.39 The
Montagu-Chelmsford report of 1918 differed from Curtis’s dyarchy in many respects, but it
enshrined his key proposals, which informed the British legislation that would have to be
implemented by the Government of India. There were thoroughgoing geographies to Curtis’s world
view, which found their way through to governmental debates over the proposals. One was a
networked geography of connections and international comparisons, the other was an
8epistemological grid which named the problem that India faced as one of vertical versus horizontal
divisions of government.
Networking Indian constitutional reform40
In her biography of Curtis, Deborah Lavin suggested that he had perfected public relations before
the profession existed.41 A vital part of this was his networking; his tireless campaigning to embed
his ideas and ideals into the minds and practices of the key players in wartime constitutional
problem-solving.42 His global career and imperial federalist scope also created a second form of
networking that brought international comparisons and components into his solutions to the Indian
conundrum.
Curtis had suggested the idea of adapting imperial federalist structures to those internal to India and
had convinced an ex-member of the Bengal Executive Council, Sir William Duke, to write a discussion
paper applying the proposal to Bengal.43 Curtis sent it to Viceroy Chelmsford and the Home
Department, though it did not seem to influence their proposals for reform in mid-1916. He arrived
in India in October 1916 and campaigned ceaselessly for the dyarchy concept; he also ensured that
Montagu had a copy of the Duke Memorandum on the lengthy sea-journey to India in November
1917.44 He docked at Bombay a convert to the principle, only to find that dyarchy had become the
term for debate in India. Curtis had continued drumming up support, building on his existing
contacts; he knew Viceroy Chelmsford and had been invited out by Sir James Meston, Governor of
the United Provinces; he was acquainted with Herbert Baker, who had designed the new capital at
Pretoria in South Africa and was working with Edwin Lutyens on designing New Delhi; he was met by
the influential journalist and author Valentine Chirol; and he toured widely, interviewing prominent
Indian political leaders. He “interrogated” government officials, asking them what the ultimate
purpose of British government was.45 By the time of Montagu’s arrival in November 1917 he had
convinced 64 Europeans and 90 Indians to sign a Joint Address to the Viceroy and Secretary of State,
backing dyarchy.46 Though Montagu’s dyarchy was not identical to Curtis’s, his principles had
doubtlessly established an influential framework. These principles emerged from Curtis’s inherently
comparative and global mind-set:
“America with its population of one hundred millions transacts its business through
no less than forty-nine governments, national and provincial; Germany with sixty-
eight millions has over thirty such governments; Canada with eight million has nine;
Australia with five millions has seven; and South Africa with six millions has five. The
United Kingdom with its forty-five millions has but one, and that Government has
also to control interests common to peoples including more than a quarter of the
human race, who are scattered over the whole surface of the globe.”47
9What was obvious from Curtis’s principles and proposals was how closely he viewed India as part of
an imperial, federal network. In introducing the Duke Memorandum of 1916 it was made clear that
the Round Table group had developed an interest in Indian self-government only to the extent that it
would be a pre-requisite of contributing to an Imperial Parliament.48 Curtis’s outward gaze
discriminated between international takes on the national question, dismissing (Wilsonian) “self-
determination” as a principle of political conduct lacking in the practicalities of application.49
In his proposal of June 1917, in which he considered how India’s national move towards dyarchy
could be devised, Curtis appraised international political structures and contrasted their relations
between central and local governments. Canadian central-provincial relations (dictated by
successive British North America Acts) were said to be closer than those in Australia and the United
States of America but not as close as in South Africa. The model that emerged from this comparison
was that certain powers and revenues would be assigned to provincial governments which derived
their authority from the electorates of each province, all other powers and revenues being reserved
to central Government, who supplemented provincial revenues with grants. A summative metaphor
was plucked from an even higher plane to describe the Canadian model and it was from these
broader scales that Curtis’s more abstract scalar imagining of the Indian problem of provincial self-
government and the nature of its solution emerged:
“It is a solar system in which each body revolves on its own axis and travels in its
own orbit, while the power which keeps them in due relation to each other and the
central body is that of the constitution. The planets are each moved by an impetus
of their own. They are not impelled by the sun, but by the power of the system in
which they revolve.”50
Naming the problem: the vertical and the horizontal
“In the first of these studies, the chain of authority was traced from the Imperial
Cabinet in London to Delhi and Simla, thence to the capital of the province, to the
city which forms the centre of the division, to the country town which forms the
centre of the district, and finally, to the village which constitutes the typical unit of
Indian society. But let it be realized that in all these cities and towns there dwells but
one-tenth of the total population of India. The remaining nine-tenths live in purely
rural surroundings, and draw their subsistence directly or indirectly from tillage of
the soil.”51
From the solar system to a federal world, from imperial London to an Indian village, Curtis invoked
the full nominalist power of place-naming and the scaling of politics to advance his cause. It was the
scalar geography of Empire that Curtis identified as the problem to be tackled in devising dyarchy:
“Wherever the imperial problem... is met, it may invariably be traced to some failure to separate
local from imperial issues.”52 He turned his experience of the dominion problem to an analysis of the
internal political geographies of India, and came up with a solution involving some ingenious political
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geometry. While abstract, Curtis insisted that this solution should not be separated from the realities
of Indian life. He acknowledged that all Indian provinces were different, but suggested that they
were all constructed on a “common plan”, so carried out a detailed series of studies of the
functioning of Sir James Meston’s United Provinces (UP). As the quote above suggests, these studies
linked the soil of India straight “up” to the Imperial Cabinet in Downing Street. His UP study provided
further detail of its divisions into: 48 districts of a million souls each; each of these into subdivisions,
which contained one or two tahsils, which were grouped around the town selected as the centre of
the districts, “like the petals of a rose”; tahsils were divided into parganas supervised by kanugos,
who supervised the patwaris who compiled data for land revenue assessment, including the villages:
“Here at last we come to the natural unit of Indian society, the corpuscle made of human atoms,
from which the body politic of India is composed.”53 In attempting to imagine how this complex
reality might be politically reconfigured into a generalizable abstraction, Curtis claimed inspiration
from “one of the ablest administrators in the country” who felt that the solution was to introduce
reform on “horizontal” not “vertical” functional lines:
“… it should not be beyond the wit of constitutional experts to frame a scheme of
advance along the road of horizontal lines of increasing popular control over all the
functions of government instead of vertical lines separating particular functions and
without reaching a chasm that must be crossed in one bound.”54
For such an abstractly spatial programme it is surprising that Curtis did not help readers visualise his
plan. Instead he adopted a militaristic metaphor for explaining his strategy for protecting imperial
sovereignty within a system of colonial administrative reform. The army, he suggested, had both a
military fighting corps and a technical corps, responsible for logistics and infrastructure: “These
collateral services are divided, so to speak, from each other by vertical lines. Each separate service,
however, is also divided into two principal grades by a horizontal line.”55 Vertical lines here separate
functions which sit on the same level. Horizontal lines divide a level from that above or below it; in
the army metaphor this would denote commissioned officers above, and the rank and file below.
The general staff of the army was drawn from both technical and regimental staff. For Curtis, this
was how the central Government of India functioned; a tier above the diverse provinces, separated
by a horizontal line. Some of these provinces (corps) would be subject to the direct control of
Government of India (general staff), and this power had to be retained. What Curtis was suggesting
was the importance of retaining ultimate political sovereignty by refusing a total devolution of
power,56 across an uncrossable “chasm”, down the vertical hierarchy (divided by horizontal lines) as
follows:57
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PARLIAMENT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
GOVERNOR-GENERAL (VICEROY)
PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, LIEUTENANT-GENERALS, CHIEF COMMISSIONERS
DISTRICT OFFICERS
MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS, PANCHAYAT COUNCILS
Table 2
The system would, instead, favour a horizontal transfer of responsibility, a right to left movement of
vertical lines, increasing from local self-government (LSG) to weightier responsibilities and
facilitating tutorship in the arts of government, as below:
FOREIGN FINANCE LAW&ORDER EDUCATION HEALTH LSG
Table 3
The trick, however, was to combine the two movements such that certain subjects could be
maintained for either imperial, executive control or local scale, administrative control, hence the
reservation () or exclusion () of certain subjects for certain levels, and the negotiation of other
subjects at certain scales (~):
FOREIGN FINANCE LAW&ORDER EDUCATION HEALTH LSG
PARLIAMENT  ~    
SECRETARY
OF STATE
 ~    
VICEROY    ~ ~ 
PROVINCIAL  ~ ~   
DISTRICT      
MUNICIPAL    ~  
Table 4
Proposals by the Viceroy, inspired by Curtis and amended by the central government, were
circulated to the existing provincial governments in 1918. As Robb has recounted in detail, the plans
got thoroughly ‘riddled’ by the central government, but received even harsher treatment in the
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provinces.58 The Governor of Bengal, for instance, ridiculed the rolling out of a governmental
machinery that was “…without precedent in the history of the world.”59 In the face of near total
condemnation from the provinces Chelmsford circulated a defensive memo in March 1919, co-
written with his executive council including Meston, insisting that Indians must learn to govern
themselves. If the constitutional mould into which this progression flowed was distinctive rather
than English, no one had a better suggestion than dyarchy: “It is a novelty in constitutions; and none
of us can prophesy the manner of its growth.”60 However, it was claimed that there were universal
tests of administrative machinery: its smoothness of friction in working; its burdensomeness on the
people or the reverse; its educative value, and its capacity for further development. Dyarchy passed
these practical tests, and also passed a series of additional theoretical tests, which were structured
around the political geometry used by Curtis (although the vocabulary was rotated by 90 degrees;
“horizontal” schemes now referred to wholesale transfers of power down a vertical hierarchy):
“It is possible to take a particular group of functions and hand it over to the new
authority; this we may call the vertical method of division. It is also possible to
entrust the new authority with subordinate powers in all functions; this we may call
the horizontal method of division… On exclusively theoretical considerations
accordingly our conclusion is against the horizontal division of functions.”61
On the basis of these protracted negotiations the Indian Civil Service was tasked with implementing
what became the Government of India Act (1919), and of bringing dyarchy to life. The mass
complexities of this undertaking cannot be touched upon here.62 But in the remainder of this paper I
would like to extend the use of scale to rethink two of dyarchy’s most fundamental, and opposed,
demands: of retaining imperial autocracy; and of meeting nationalist demands to devolve
democracy to the Indian public.
Autocratic Political Geographies
While the majority of contemporary discussions around the idea of dyarchy focused on the division
of subjects and the theoretical and practical possibilities of dual tiers of government, undergirding
the official response to the 1917 announcement was another concern: its re-triangulation of
bureaucracy, democracy and autocracy.63 Curtis suggested that Indian Civil Servants, contradicting
their insistence on the “multifarious diversity of conditions in India”, were obsessed with the idea of
treating India as one uniformity: “This iron uniformity is the natural product of a highly centralized
autocracy imposed on a vast country from without.”64 In addition to the racial and linguistic diversity
of India, which orientalists and indologists had pored over for centuries, the reforms of dyarchy
acknowledged and encouraged a social and political heterogeneity that confronted the government
with a democratic material “beneath” it that it needed to control.65 This would require an apparatus
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of scalar sovereignty that was networked (putting the central into the local) and nominalist (defining
what the local was).
Networks of exclusion
While to imperial cartographers India appeared as one, to colonial cartographers a singular body of
India was a geographical conceit. The dyarchy reforms further muddied the map. The already
expansive legend to maps of the Indian Empire expanded a little further. Usual map legends
included: external territories and foreign territories in India (for example Ceylon or Goa); tribal areas
(such as those bordering Afghanistan); provinces governed directly by the central government (such
as Delhi); the Princely States (such as Rajputana); and the provinces (such as UP). From the latter,
however, dyarchy added a new category: “excluded areas” of governor’s provinces. These were
regions in which autocracy had negotiated a continued free space of play during the constitutional
reforms, and from which democracy had been excluded from the outset. Although Burma was not so
excluded, it had been effectively written out of the dyarchy reforms of 1919 “due to its people being
in a separate stage of political development.”66 This view was later revised and similar reforms were
applied to Burma, though three years later. As such it was included on the map commissioned to
accompany the Simon Report, which featured six differently coloured types of territory: provinces in
light pink, centrally administered provinces in dark pink, princely states in dark yellow, tribal areas in
light yellow, outside and foreign territory in white, and excluded areas of provinces in purple (see
figure 1).67
Figure 1: Legend to “Map of India”
The Montagu-Chelmsford report acknowledged that all provinces would contain areas “... where
material on which to found political institutions was lacking.”68 These would not just be scheduled
areas of tribes, but would also include others types of “backward area” which could be wholly
excluded or have modified reforms introduced.69 The justifications provided by provincial governors
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for suggested exclusions displayed a remarkably spatial inventiveness in pawing off the
encroachments of democracy into provinces, the governance of which had previously been executed
with relatively little interference by the vast majority of the people that lived there. The Governor of
Bihar and Orissa, for instance, claimed that the civilizational diversity in the Chota Nagpur region
necessitated its exclusion from the reforms (also see figure 2):70
“The standard of civilisation varies considerably in different parts: the wilder tracts
are inhabited almost exclusively by aboriginal and semi-aboriginal tribes, while on
the other hand the division contains a certain number of towns, the most important
coal-fields in the whole of India, and an area round the Tata iron and steel works
which bids fair to become one of the most important industrial manufacturing
centres in the country.”71
Figure 2: Bihar and Orissa, with Chota Nagpur in the centre.
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These exclusionary arguments regarding civilisation were combined with those of physical
geography and up-scaled in the case of Assam, for which an argument was made concerning almost
the entire province:
“The justification for treating Assam in a special manner must be sought not so
much in its area, which as we have mentioned is almost equal to that of Bengal, as in
the very large proportion of this area which lies in the hills and is peopled by
primitive tribes, and the consequent smallness of the area, with its correspondingly
small population and revenues, which can be compared in the matter of general
progress and advancement with the rural tracts of other provinces. The problem is
also complicated by the cleavage, geographical as well as religious, social and
political, between the two valleys which comprise the more advanced portion of the
province. The Assam valley is mainly Hindu and animistic. In the Surma valley
Muslims are also in a majority.”72
What we see emerging in post-war constitutional discourse is the much older “colonial geography”
which had delineated the Himalayan hill lands (of supposedly primitive tribes) from the (supposedly
more civilised and integrated) plains by an “inner line”.73 This had been formalised in the Bengal
Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 and fed straight in to the dyarchy debates. That many of these
uplands contained tea plantations in which workers were treated with abnormal violence, and
whose voices were best kept silent, cannot have been far from the official mind in the crafting of
these exclusions.74 To reinforce the point a large map of the province was provided, marking out in
red the hilly areas that should be excluded from reform, highlighting what a small proportion of the
province the remaining lowland Surma and Assam valleys constituted (see figure 3).75
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Figure 3: Assam and proposed exclusions from constitutional reform
In the Bengal region of Darjeeling, also a tea plantation district in parts, the geographical basis for
exclusion was made even more explicit (see figure 3):
“These tracts cover a wide area. They are very sparsely populated and their
inhabitants belong to a variety of more or less savage tribes. The district is a mass of
hill, ravine and cliff, covered with dense bamboo, tree and creeper jungle. It is a
scheduled district and is also de-regulationized. Legislation is effected by Regulation
and no inhabitants of the district at present have a vote in council elections. It is
clearly a typically backward area which should be wholly excluded.”76
This was not, however, a representation accepted by all Darjeeling inhabitants. There was, actually,
a substantial educated and vocal population who had petitioned Secretary of State Montagu in
person on 7th December 1917 during his tour, asking to be separated from Bengal under the
reforms.77 Roughly 90% of the people were said to be of the “Mongol family of nations”, large
numbers of whom (especially the Gurkhas) had supplied men during the War. The phrase was that of
local Political Officer C.A. Bell, who concluded that “they are no more related to the Indians than are
the Burmese” and many seemed to view the Bengal government as a lowland, alien coloniser of the
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hillsmen.78 This was, in part, a result of colonial policy that encouraged Nepalese settling of
Darjeeling so as to protect this area, treasured for its significance in terms of economic, political and
health geographies, from the disruptive anti-colonial nationalism emerging in Bengal.79 The petition
had requested separation from Bengal and direct control from Delhi, with some degree of self-
government. Exclusion could here function as a means of liberation rather than abandonment,
though the intricacies of this case would continue to unfurl in the coming years.
Many of these bids for exclusion were accepted by the central government, though in mid-
December 1919 W.S. Marris, by now Reforms Commissioner, made it clear they still had “…to clear
up the backward tract question” so the heads of the provinces were consulted a month later.80 The
case of Darjeeling proved to be one of the most difficult, because of its people not because of “mass
of hill”. The Bengal government had suggested not excluding Darjeeling entirely but having the
Governor exclude certain Acts and overrule elected Indian Ministers when necessary. The Reforms
department in New Delhi flatly refused this proposal, however: “Under the arrangements
contemplated, Darjeeling will have no representation in the Legislative council and the position of
Ministers in regard to the district will be anomalous. There does not seem to be any via media
[middle road] between exclusion and inclusion, and the suggested compromise is not considered
practicable.”81
These central debates took place in the face of mounting controversy within the Darjeeling region on
the politics of its exclusion. On 6th February 1920 the Secretary of the Kalimpong Samiti sent a
telegram to the Viceroy, expressing the Tibeto-Indian population’s “… intense horror and dismay to
learn that it has been proposed to grant the new Reform Scheme to them only partially and that
they have been classed among backward tracts.”82 They objected that they were in no way inferior
to any other community, requested the full application of the reforms, and insisted that their
previous petition to Montagu “… was merely for the creation of a new hilly Province of their own but
not for exclusions from the Reform Scheme.” Similar sentiments were expressed by the loyalist
Darjeeling Hillmen’s Association in a letter to the Viceroy on 20th February.83 The hillsmen were,
rather than backward, an “advanced tract”, full of people as vigorous as any under the Government
of India, with a higher than average literacy rate for the province, who were keen to contribute to
the welfare of India and the British Empire. Against this British affinity, the hillsmen were said to
differ from the people of Bengal in terms of geography, race, history, religion and language: “It is
only the accident of the common British domination during the last few decades which has linked us
together politically.” Union with Bengal under the reforms would allow the “plainsmen” to swamp
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the hills while the hillsmen were said, for unexplained reasons of health, to be unable to work in the
plains.84
The Nadia District Association was even more explicit in a resolution from June that year. The
exclusion of Darjeeling from the Reforms was a movement started by European planters, which they
suggested was aiming to create an “Ulster in Bengal”. This responded to a joint resolution by the
Darjeeling Planters’ Association, the European Association and the Hillsmen Association of March
1920 which, though pleading for a form of local self-government, had insisted Darjeeling be
excluded from the reforms. The Simon Report map of 1930 featured, however, the small district of
Darjeeling in deep, excluded, purple. The Report noted that the Government had tried to limit
exclusion as much as possible, matching “degrees of backwardness” with “degrees of exclusion”.85
Five provinces had areas so backward as to be wholly excluded from reforms, namely: Madras (the
Laccadive Islands and Minicoy); Bengal (the Chittagong Hill Tracts); the Punjab (Spiti); Burma (all
listed backward tracts); and Bihar and Orissa (Angul). “Modified exclusions” were applied by the
reserved half of provincial governments to provincial enactments, notifying all or parts of them to
the tracts at their discretion. In addition to the Agency Tracts in Madras and Lahaul in the Punjab the
three areas discussed above were listed in this category of modified exclusion: in Bengal, Darjeeling;
in Bihar and Orissa, Chota Nagpur, the Santhal Parganas, and Sambalpur, and in Assam, “all the
backward tracts of the province.”86
Some recent studies have viewed mountains as areas in which imperial sovereignty struggled to
ascend, or as places to which colonised populations could migrate to escape state reforms.87 Yet in
Darjeeling constitutional reforms were exacting in their exceptions and geography, while local
residents fought to pull in reform, not to push it out. This is because the reforms were viewed to be
democratic ones, bringing with them enfranchisement and voice, not just the capacities for tax,
census, and surveillance. But embedded within the reforms was, both in the open and in secret, the
nominalist power of autocracy which insisted upon its sovereign capacity to distinguish between,
and name, the local and the central, the insignificant and the imperial.
Naming the local as imperial
“For the first time the principle of autocracy, which had not been wholly discarded in
earlier forms, was definitely abandoned; the conception of the British Government
as a benevolent despotism was finally renounced; and in its place was substituted
that a guiding authority whose role it would be to assist the steps of India along the
road that, in the fullness of time, would lead to complete Self-Government within
the Empire.”88
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In 1928 the Allahabad High Court Advocate Sir Kishen Mehra was still suggesting that, through
dyarchy, the Government of India had abandoned autocracy and radically reconfigured its
bureaucracy, the Indian Civil Service, around democracy. He added the rider to the statement above,
however, that the government retained powers of supervision and, if necessary, intervention. The
latter provided, for some, evidence that dyarchy was but a cloak for ongoing imperial autocratic
sovereignty, while others argued that it’s powers of supervision so structured dyarchy against
effective democracy that it didn’t merit the name. For such arguments, the devil is in the detail, only
some demonstrative examples of which can be sketched below.
Within a few years of its application dyarchy had proven so controversial that an official
investigation was established.89 Its failure to adequately criticise the working of the 1919 Act led to a
supplementary Minority Report of dispute.90 The 1919 Act was here criticised for both its power to
prevent certain subjects from being voted upon or discussed in either central or local chambers (the
inbuilt, everyday powers of supervision, discussed below), and its exceptional powers, regarding:91
1. Expenditure: “Special powers are reserved to the Governor-General enabling him to authorise in
cases of emergency such expenditure as may, in his opinion, be necessary for the safety,
tranquillity or interests of British India or any part thereof.”
2. Ordinances: “The Governor-General has also the power, in cases of emergency, to pass
ordinances for the leave and good government of British India to operate for a period of six
months at a time.”
3. Certification: “The Governor also has the power of preventing the introduction of any bill if he
certified that the bill or part of it affects the safety or tranquillity of his province or any part of it
or of another province, and upon such certification the proceedings are dropped.”
This report reflected (and no doubt stimulated) popular commentary against the working of dyarchy.
Attention was drawn not only to the embedding of autocracy within the system, but to the
particularly verticalist and scalar powers of intervention that this autocracy wielded. Criticisms
targeted, for instance: the ability to recall a devolved and transferred subject into a “reserved”
subject if it was not dealt with satisfactorily; the total lack of responsibility in central government
(the autocratic relic of devolution of democracy to the provinces); the safeguarding of the
irresponsible authority of the Governor-General in Council by extraordinary powers of veto and
certification; and the division of budgets into votable and non-votable items, which meant that:
“Even in the Provincial Legislatures, autocracy, though weakened, still sits armed with the rights of
certification and entrenched behind the Reserved half of the Government.”92 The nature of these
interventions pinpointed the scalar sovereignty of the ultimate authority in India; that was, the
capacity to distinguish between the imperial and the local. Shah and Bahadurji had referenced the
1833 decision that the Supreme Government could interfere in local concerns if they were
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indispensable to the maintenance of imperial unity and if it avoided “petty, vexatious and meddling
interference”:93
“But in practice it is very difficult to determine exactly where the just control of
general principles ends, and the petty, vexatious, meddlesome interference in detail
begins. It may quite conceivably happen that what is normally a detail, which had
best be left to the local Government, might in exceptional circumstances, assume
the dignity of a great principle… And yet it must be said that the history of the last
century or so all over the world shows the struggles of imperialism—if one may so
describe the centralising tendencies—against provincialism, resulting in the
indisputable victory of the former.”94
Yet it was not just through occasional exceptional incidents of overrule or centralising victory over
the local that dyarchy’s democratic potential was undermined. The everyday, normal, structures of
dyarchy had also fundamentally worked to undermine the spread of democratic praxis. The size of
the official block (as opposed to the elected ministry) in provincial councils meant that elected
ministers often had to rely on the official vote, leading to loss of support for elected members, who
were deemed to have too quickly become government “lackeys”.95 The reservation of subjects at the
provincial level provided the central government with a direct route in to provincial politics, hence
undercutting the supposedly radical devolutionary powers of dyarchy. Government officials in the
Indian Civil Service refused to cooperate with Indian ministers, while the division of subjects into
reserved and transferred subjects was said to be unworkable, especially given the lack of a divided
purse (ie split budgets, rather than official controlled budgets).96 Even the Majority Reforms Enquiry
Report agreed on this point:
“The division of subjects into reserved and transferred subjects is of the very
essence of dyarchy, and dyarchy must be held responsible for any failure in the
working of the constitution which can be directly attributed to the administration of
a transferred subject impinging upon the administration of a reserved subject or vice
versa.”97
However, to judge Dyarchy on these terms would be to cede too much to a juridico-political view of
government, and to circumscribe the “constitution” of India to an arm of the governmental
apparatus. In one sense a narrative like that above does work to undercut the power of the colonial
state, showing that it was continually at war within itself, that it was resisted even within its own
Enquiries, and that public commentaries quickly picked up on the contradictions of the autocratic
democracy on offer. But dyarchy was designed to fail in two senses. First, reserved subjects were
designed to be transferred over time such that Dyarchy would consume itself (the 1935 Act is
viewed by many as the realisation of this fate).98 But the second was that the system was rigged so
that democratic challenges to the still autocratic Government of India were unlikely (due to official
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weightings in the chambers) to succeed and could be easily overridden by the Executive should they
emerge.
The central government thus bid its future in India on the stakes of reserved subjects. Tellingly, in
official and un-official circles these came to be referred to as “law and order” subjects, while
transferred subjects were referred to as those of “nation building”.99 The state’s failure to grasp the
significance of the latter in part explains its inability to grasp the vital material upon which the mass
nationalist movements of the 1920s were based. In conclusion I will suggest that this was a failure to
appreciate the scale of the local and the provincial, but also to appreciate the time-scale of
democracy and biopolitics in interwar India.
Sequences and Scales of Democracy
The challenge throughout this paper has been to speak of the international, imperial and Indian
scales while retaining an interest in the specificities and micropolitics involved in etching out a new
constitutional order. The solutions above have included thinking about the intellectual historical
geography of Lionel Curtis, and the exceptions and intrusions of autocracy into the new supposedly
democratic landscape of dyarchy. The gains made through this juridico-political focus come at the
cost, however, of neglecting the broader governmentalities to which dyarchy contributed. From this
perspective the elements described above become just a handful of the myriad origins of the
changing political and social world in 1920s India to which dyarchy contributed. For instance, it
accepted and accelerated the communal electorates introduced by the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms,
supplementing religious protections with electorates for urban, rural, and commercial
constituencies.100 It provided fora for new spaces of political cooperation and contestation to
emerge. Gandhi’s Indian National Congress refused to enter the new assemblies, though some
Congress members did under the banner of the Swarajist Party, though they then also divided into
“workers” and “wreckers” within the system. Some feared that the sight of powerless Indian
ministers would undermine voter confidence in the system, breeding irresponsibility.101 But in other
senses participation in provincial assemblies formed the habits and conducts of adversarial politics:
unpicking government budgets; stirring up public controversies; providing voices for religious and
ethnic minorities; and even boycotting the bureaucracy of the state, which could be seen as an
intense engagement with the politics of dyarchy, not its abandonment: “It was a conscious act of
refusal which was, in itself, a determined expression of the will of the electorate.”102
Beyond the formally political, dyarchy also created financial and policy spaces for innovation and
experimentation. The Minority Report drew attention to such efforts in Madras in terms of
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appointing village officers, proposing new universities, granting free school meals to poorer children
while also calling for economy in other types of expenditure to fund these outlays.103 Others drew
attention to the social reform bills that the limited but popular mandate allowed provincial
governments to pass, regarding sexual or religious reform, in ways that the central government
could not contemplate due to the risk of political controversy.104 These were the subjects of nation
building. As the quote with which this paper opened suggested, the British may well have been able,
in the 1920s, to provide better policemen, engineers, financiers, diplomats, lawyers or soldiers. But
what of teachers, nurses, municipal committees, and community workers, “…which go to make good
government as against efficient government, which help to uplift an entire people”?105
The point was made at length and with great force by “Kerala Putra” a pseudonym for KM Pannikar.
Pannikar was an administrator and diplomat who also published political commentaries, popular
histories, historical geographies, and studies in Malayalam literature, often focusing on
constitutional reform and the Princely States. In his 1928 book on the workings of dyarchy he
reflected upon nineteenth century India, when political government meant only “efficient
administration”, not the social life of the people or the “vague moods and unvocal feelings”
mentioned at the start of this paper.106 Politics had changed by the 1920s, he suggested, but the
colonial state had completely failed to keep up:
“People now clamour for social reform, that is the interference of the State in the
customs and institutions of the people. Their complaint now is that the British
Government does not lend its support to the efforts that are being made to re-order
society. And this is but natural. So long as the State was merely a tax-collecting
machine, ensuring peace and safety, freedom for the individual could not mean
anything else… But the State has long ago ceased to be a mere tax-collecting
machine. Modern life makes a superimposed state an impossibility. A state has to
educate, legislate, and control a man in a hundred other ways…
“With this changed conception of the functions of the State, comes the new idea of
liberty as the right of men to order his own state, especially as it is an organisation
which interferes in so much of his life. Liberty now is not freedom from state control
but the right to control the state. This, as we have seen, arises from the growth of
the functions of executive government. A state which does not educate, which does
not enforce sanitation, fight diseases, regulate conditions of work &c., will not now
be considered civilised. This enlargement of functions necessarily involved limitation
of individual freedom and group autonomy. The Hindu can no longer be allowed to
refuse being vaccinated, on the plea of religious scruples—because small-pox among
one section involves danger to the life of others—than he can refuse to pay
taxes.”107
Pannikar did not simply say that dyarchy had failed, though many commentators reached this
conclusion.108 Rather, Pannikar was suggesting that the British were out of time in India. This was not
just a question of their time being up; rather, they were out of synch with the state, and the nation,
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that their constitutional reforms had helped take shape. The return view by many British saw Indian
claims for democracy and self-government as out of sequence. In June 1917 Viceroy Chelmsford had
insisted that the fault of the 1909 Morley Minto reforms was that they had skipped a whole stage of
political evolution, and that this had to be undergone before further powers could be granted.109
This was a question of democratic transition, but it was also a question of presumed functional links
between different components of modernity. The Burmese, for instance, had initially been excluded
from constitutional reform “…due to its people being in a separate stage of political
development.”110 Capitalist industrialisation, urbanisation, secular politics, and reorganised family
structures were all related components for increased democratisation. This was part of the
“symmetrical” thinking that Sudipta Kaviraj has identified as a prevalent western view of
modernisation.111 While some elements might be introduced into a society earlier or later, they
would, and must, eventually emerge to constitute a proper replication of European modernity.
The alternative view outlined by Kaviraj, and consistent with Pannikar’s provincial reading of Europe,
was that the sequence in which the components of modernity emerged was important. Different
origins and conditions of development of the components of modernity meant that Indian
democracy was emerging in radically different conditions and sequences to that of Britain. India was,
in Pannikar’s words, part of “modern life”, in which it was already acknowledged that a “civilised”
state had to go beyond tax collecting and policing to education, sanitation, disease control and
labour protection. Yet the dyarchy model was bound to a progressivist conception of temporal
evolution along the lines of western modernity and democracy, dictating that the reserved subjects
of “law and order” (Pannikar’s “efficient administration” of the 19th century) had to be learnt before
those of “nation building” (Pannikar’s society-changing and interventionist state). The duration of
this tutorship would depend upon the success with which the transferred subjects were
administered. As the ex-Viceroy Lord Curzon dryly commented shortly before the Montagu reforms
announcement of August 1917: “When the cabinet used the expression ‘ultimate self-government’
they probably contemplated an intervening period of 500 years.”112
But many Indians were building a nation, irrespective of their tutorship, within the constitutionally
reformed framework of the colonial state. This nation was forming within an internal, private,
traditional sovereign realm beyond the external, public, modernity of colonialism.113 But it was also
taking shape in the scalar domain of the province, at which politicians were crafting new forms of
nationalist political engagement, whether between wrecking or working with the assemblies, or
between financial austerity and social experimentation. If it was argued that the hill lands and
jungles of India represented a past, unsuited to modern democracy and governmentality, then the
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province represented a possible Indian future. Here sovereignty would not be “reserved” to a
political elite but would be, supposedly, “transferred” to the people via thoroughgoing provincial
biopolitics. In practice, provincial reform plans were often frustrated by lack of finance or of partisan
coalitions strong enough to get the plans actualised, both of which were logical and intentional
outcomes of the embedding of autocracy within the putatively democratic frames of dyarchy.
As such, this paper has drawn attention to the politics of networks (Curtis’s comparative
constitutionalism and his networking, and the government’s exclusionary provincial networks of
democracy) and nominalism (naming the connections between London and the village, or of where
is local or imperial) that exposed the non-naturalness of scale in British India. But Pannikar and
Kaviraj also alert us to questions of time-scale and sequence, of disrupting the chronopolitics of
western democracy, but this was in part done through re-articulating the spatial-scale of the
province.114 Following the 1935 Government of India Act the 1937 elections saw Congress come to
dominate many provincial governments, reducing the experimental space of play in the name of a
nationally coherent vision of a developmental state.115 Although this system is and was referred to
as “provincial autonomy” the central state retained its “vertical” connections to London, its various
reserved subjects, its excluded areas, and its powers of intervention, representing a refined form of
dyarchy that provided a vital genealogical link between post-war constitutional reform, post-colonial
federation, and the politics of vague moods and unvocal feelings.
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